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THE MAYAGUEZ: THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT
PASSAGE AND TBE LEGALITY OF REPRISAL
On May 12, 1975 the SS Mayaguez, a merchant vessel of United
States registry enroute from Hong Kong to Thailand manned by a
United States citizen crew, was fired upon, stopped, boarded and
seized by Cambodian naval forces in the vicinity of Poulo Wai Is-
lands in the Gulf of Thailand.1 While the position of the Mayaguez
at the time of seizure is disputed, the vessel was reportedly under-
way some sixty nautical miles2 from the Cambodian mainland and
six and one-half nautical miles south of Poulo Wai.3 Subsequent
diplomatic efforts by the United States government proved unsuc-
cessful, and military operations were undertaken, resulting in the
recapture of the merchant vessel and the freeing of its crewmen
on May 15, 1975.
Use of military force by the United States government to secure
the release of the Mayaguez, based on the alleged illegality of the
seizure and Cambodian failure to respond to diplomatic efforts,4
was apparently justified by the doctrine of reprisal.5 There are,
1. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
2. A nautical mile is 6,076.10 feet, or 2,025.37 yards. J. HILL, T. UTEGAAR
& G. RionDAN, DUTrON's NAVIGATiON & POTING 11 (1957).
3. Initial reports placed the Mayaguez eight miles south of Poulo Wai
while Cambodian government sources claimed the ship was two and one-
half to three miles east of the islands. Charles T. Miller, the captain of
the Mayaguez, later stated the seizure occurred six and one-half miles south
of Poulo Wai. See N.Y. Times, May 13, 1975, at 19, col. 4; id., May 16, 1975,
at 15, col. 5; id., May 18, 1975, at 26, col. 3.
4. COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 94-151, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Letter from President Gerald Ford
to United States Senator Edward W. Brooke, May 21, 1975, and Letter from
Robert J. McCloskey, U.S. State Department, to United States Senator Ed-
ward W. Brooke, June 20, 1975, in 121 CoNG. REc. S 11,572-11,574 (daily ed.
June 25, 1975).
5. It should be noted that members of the United Nations are not to
engage in reprisals with the same freedom from constraint that predated
their membership, because article two, paragraph four of the United Nations
Charter prohibits the use of force to settle disputes. Commentators have
noted the linkage of the use of force with the criterion of self-defense. The
argument has been advanced, however, that the prohibition against use of
force is directed to acts violating the territorial integrity or political inde-
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however, three prerequisite elements for a legitimate reprisal:
first, an illegal act of one State against another; second, an unsatis-
fied demand for redress of the injury; and third, a reasonable use
of force to obtain reparation from the delinquent State.0
In this article, only the first element of a legitimate reprisal will
be examined,7 namely, did the seizure constitute an international
wrong? Three aspects of this element will be considered: whether
the Mayaguez was within Cambodia's territorial waters, whether
the ship was engaged in innocent passage, and finally, whether
Cambodia had a legitimate claim to the Wai Islands, offshore of
which the vessel was seized.
EXTENT OF THE C mODIAN TERRITORIAL SEA
Seizure of the Mayaguez occured within six and one-half miles
of the Poulo Wai Islands, and Cambodia claimed the ship was in
territorial waters." The United States, however, recognizing a
territorial sea limit of three miles, charged Cambodia with commit-
ting an illegal act of seizing a United States vessel on the high seas.[
Since, under these circumstances, the boarding and seizure can
arguably be lawful only if so done in Cambodia's territorial waters,
pendence of nations, not acts of force limited in international effect to pro-
tection of nationals or to recovery of damages. 1 D. O'CoNNELL, INERN A-
TiONAL LAW 328 (1965).
The argument is also made that article 51 of the United Nations Charter,
which permits the use of force in self-defense, may be coupled with the
above view in article two, paragraph four, to allow member nations to take
armed action in self-defense against any actual armed interference with the
enjoyment of rights under international law. Schwarzenberger, Report on
Some Aspects of the Principle of Self-Defence in the Charter of the United
Nations and the Topics Covered by the Dubrovnik Resolution, in INTEaNA-
TIONAL LAW ASsOcIATION, REPORT Op THE FoRTY-EiGHTH CONFERENCE 550, 573
(1959).,
6. See 2 L. OPPENHrE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 34-41 (1906); INTERNATIONAL
LAw SiTuATIoNs (U.S. Naval War College ed. 1938).
7. The second element, an unsatisfied demand for redress, was evidently
met by Cambodia's retention of the Mayaguez from May 12 until its recov-
ery by the United States forces on May 15, even though the United States
had requested its release from the Cambodian mission in Peking and had
asked the assistance of the Chinese government in Peking in obtaining the
release of the Mayaguez on May 12 and had asked the Secretary General of
the United Nations on May 14 for similar assistance. Letter from Robert J.
McCloskey, supra note 4.
The third element, whether the force utilized was reasonable to accom-
plish the rectification of the international wrong, is beyond the scope of
this article. See generally 6 G. HAcwoRTE DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
154 (1940); L. OPPExEIm, supra note 6, at 34-42; INTERNATIONAL LAW Snru-
ATIONS, supra note 6, at 56-62.
8. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1975, at 18, col. 2.
9. Letter from Robert J. McCloskey, supra note 4.
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an initial determination must be made as to whether Cambodia's
territorial sea extends to the point of seizure.
International and Unilateral Evolution of the Territorial Sea
The territorial sea, a maritime zone or band adjacent to a coastal
State's shoreline, is considered as a prolongation of territory over
which the coastal State may exercise jurisdiction. 10 This concept
of a maritime zone is now almost universally accepted in interna-
tional law," though the extent of the coastal State's sovereignty
and the breadth of the territorial sea have yet to be defined by
international agreement. 12 The major reason for the lack of
agreement has been, as in the seizure of the Mayaguez, a divergence
in interests between the coastal States and the foreign States whose
vessels seek passage through the territorial sea. These competing
interests have resisted international codification-both in respect
to the breadth of the territorial sea as well as to the coastal State's
degree of sovereignty over it3
In the seventeenth century, it was proposed a coastal zone be
limited only by the State's ability to effectuate its control over the
sea.' 4 The idea that a coastal State could claim sovereignty over
adjacent sea which it effectively controlled gave rise to the
"cannon-shot rule," favored until the early twentieth century.' 5
10. See Fraser, The Extent and Delimitation of Territorial Waters, 11
CORHELL L.Q. 455, 465 (1926).
11. C. COLOMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 87 (6th ed. 1967).
12. Knight, Issues Before the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, 34 LA. L. REV. 155, 182 (1974); Mead, The Great Territorial
Sea Squabble, 95 U.S. NAVAL INST. PRoc. 45 (Apr. 1969).
13. See notes 32-49 infra and accompanying text. Earliest references to
the territorial sea are abundant with contradictions between claims denying
sovereignty over coastal waters and claims of actual ownership and com-
plete sovereignty. Fenn, Origins of the Theory of Territorial Waters, 20
AM. J. INT'L L. 465 (1926). A recently published study concluded that
probably the earliest formal pronouncement on the legal status of the seas
was that of Roman law. Second century writings simply declared the sea
and the fish in it were open or common to all men. There was no exten-
sion of state jurisdiction from shore to seaward. S. SwARzTRAUBER, TuE
THmE-MILE LnmT or THE TEsRROIAm L SEAS 10 (1972). The contrary view,
a claim to absolute sovereignty, was advanced in the sixteenth century. C.
COLONMOS, supra note 11, at 89.
14. See Kent, The Historical Origins of the Three Mile Limit, 48 AaVL J.
INT'L L. 537 (1954).
15. S. SWARTZTRAUBER, supra note 13, at 25. Swartztrauber states the
When this rule was first recognized, the art of gunnery was such
that a typical cannon's effective range was about a marine league,
or three nautical miles.-6 This led to the concept of a three-mile
limit, later assimilated into international recognition of the extent
of the territorial sea.17
In the twentieth century, the international community attempted
to codify the law of the sea, especially that concerning the terri-
torial sea. Major conventions were held in the Hague in 1930,
Geneva in 1958 and 1960 and the first two substantive sessions of
the latest convention in Caracas in 1974 and Geneva in 1975.18
Forty-two states sent delegates to the 1930 Hague Codification
Conference, and although no treaty was agreed upon, a Draft on
"The Legal Status of the Territorial Sea" was adopted. The Draft
proclaimed a belt of territorial sea forms part of the territory of
a State and the sovereignty exercised over this belt is to be the
same as that which the State exercises over its land domain, though
limited by "conditions established by international law."'0  The
conference did not come to an agreement about the breadth of the
territorial sea, however. Subsequent conferences have suffered the
same fate.20
"cannon-shot rule" as: "A state exercises sovereignty over its coastal
waters as far as a cannon can shoot."
16. Walker, Territorial Waters: The Cannon Shot Rule, 22 BRIT. Y.,B.
INT'L L. 210-31 (1945).
17. For a discussion of the cannon-shot rule and a criticism of its uncer-
tainty in application see C. COLOMBOS, supra note 11, at 92-94 and S.
SwARTzTRAIuER, supra note 13, at 24-25. The United States made the limit
of its territorial sea three miles rather than the range of a cannon by a
declaration of Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson in 1793, I THE AMERICAN
STATE PAPERs 1789-1794, at 195-196, and an act of Congress in 1794. Act of
June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 6, 1 Stat. 384.
18. United Press International dispatch, May 14, 1975, in 121 CONG. REC.
H 4136 (daily ed. May 15, 1975) (Caracas and Geneva Conventions 1974-
1975); I G. HAcxwoRTB, supra note 7, at 646-51 (Hague Convention); Burke,
Some Comments on the 1958 Convention, 1958 PROC. Am . Soc'Y INT'L L. 197,
198-200 (1959) (Geneva Convention); Recent Developments in the Law of
the Sea: A Synopsis, 12 SAN DiE-o L. Rsv. 665, 666-67 (1975).
19. No limitation on sovereignty was specified other than the right of in-
nocent passage. I G. HACKWORTH, supra note 7, at 624.
20. The 1958 Geneva Convention did succeed in adopting a Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone but again there was no
agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea. "The outer limit of the
territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a distance from the
nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the territorial sea."
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done at Geneva,
Apr. 29, 1958, art. 6, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.LA.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. Simi-
larly, the 1960 Geneva Conference, which was called principally for the pur-
pose of agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea, produced no agree-
ment. C. CoLomBos, supra note 11, at 109. The Third Law of the Sea Con-
vention in its Caracas sessions in 1974 and its Geneva sessions in 1975 has
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What could not be agreed upon by international conventions
became the subject of unilateral actions by coastal States. Follow-
ing failure of the 1930 Hague Convention to fix a breadth to the
territorial sea, coastal States began to declare the extent of their
territorial sea. A number of nations have adopted territorial seas
of varying extents, the only common characteristic of which is most
are in excess of three miles.21 A 1974 compilation of territorial
sea claims showed over fifty States claimed a territorial sea of
twelve nautical miles, twenty-two States claimed more than twelve
nautical miles, while only thirty-four claimed three miles.22
It is against this background of unilateral action that Cambodia's
claims to a territorial sea must be viewed. As part of the French
colonial possession of Indochina, Cambodia claimed a territorial sea
of three nautical miles, and maintained this claim after gaining
independence in 1954.23 In 1957 its territorial sea was extended
to five nautical miles, and the decree of September 27, 1969
extended the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles. 24 Thus, the
seizure of the Mayaguez, six and one-half miles from Poulo Wai
Island, was within the proclaimed territorial waters of Cam-
bodia.25
The United States, however, has consistently refused to give
recognition to rights claimed by other States outside a three-mile
not yet decided on an internationally accepted breadth of the territorial sea.
Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea: A Synopsis, supra note 18,
at 666-67 (Caracas sessions); United Press International dispatch, supra
note 18 (Geneva sessions).
21. El Salvador and Honduras claimed a two-hundred-nautical-mile ter-
ritorial sea in 1950. S. SWARTZTRAUBER, supra note 13, at 164; 4 M. WHITE-
mAN, DIGEST Or INTERNATIONAL LAW 802 (1965). Chile, Ecuador and Peru
claimed a two-hundred-nautical-mile territorial sea in 1952. C. COLOMBOS,
supra note 11, at 97-99. Representatives of the Caribbean states, including
Mexico, approved the Declaration of Santo Domingo on July 7, 1972, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.138/80 (1972) and the African States Regional Seminar held in
Yaounde June 20-30, 1972 adopted a resolution, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/79
(1972), both of which called for the establishment of a twelve-nautical-mile
territorial sea.
22. 36 U.S. STATE DEPT., INTERNATIONAL BoUNDARY STUDY: LuVITs IN TEE
SEAS 13 (2d rev. ed., Apr. 1, 1974); see Gutteridge, Beyond the Three Mile
Limit: Recent Developments Affecting the Law of the Sea 14 VA. J. INT'L L.
195 (1974).
23. 36 U.S. STATE DEPT., supra note 22, at 13.
24. Id.
25. But see notes 59-77 infra and accompanying text.
limit.26 In 1973 the United States reaffirmed its adherence to the
three-mile limit.
Under international law the United States is not obligated to recog-
nize or give effect to territorial sea claims in excess of three miles
in breadth, nor claims to zones of special coastal state jurisdictional
competence (i.e. relative to fishing, customs, fiscal or sanitary
requirements) in excess of twelve miles in breadth. Not all states
agree that their jurisdictional competence is limited in the same
manner described, however, and may have claimed territorial seas
in excess of three miles.27
After the Mayaguez was captured, the United States reiterated
its refusal to recognize a territorial sea greater than three miles.
Thus, the United States claimed Cambodia's seizure took place on
the high seas.
28
However, in asking whether the reprisal taken against Cambodia
was initiated on a basis which is legal under international law, the
question is not whether a national wrong was committed against
the United States, but rather whether such acts constituted an in-
ternational wrong. That Cambodia claims a twelve-nautical-mile
territorial sea which the United States refuses to recognize does not
make a seizure six and one-half nautical miles offshore de facto un-
lawful. To the contrary, "if in fact twenty-five states claim a
twelve mile limit, it is scarcely likely that any international tribu-
nal would hold such a claim . . . illegal per se in international
law."29 There has never been any customary international law con-
cerning the maximum breadth of the territorial sea.30 The three-
26. After failure to adopt a breadth to the territorial sea by the 1960
Geneva Conference, Mr. Arthur J. Dean, Chairman of the United States Del-
egation said:
The three mile limit was regarded by the United States as interna-
tional law ... unilateral claims to greater breadth conflicted with
the universally accepted principle of the freedom of the seas and
ought to be rejected. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.19/SR.14, at 6 (1960).
Earlier the United States had informed El Salvador that the United States
"would not consider its nationals or vessels or aircraft as being subject"
to the two-hundred-mile territorial sea. Note 160 from Ambassador Shaw
to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dept. of State, Dec. 12, 1950, file 716.022/12-
1250 in 4 M. WnTEMAN, supra note 21, at 802.
27. Letter from Charles N. Brower, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of
State, to United States Senator Henry Jackson, July 26, 1973, in Hearings
on the Law of the Sea Conference Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 395 (1973).
28. Letter from Robert J. McCloskey, supra note 4.
29. D. BownTT, THE LAw OF THE SEA 13 (1967).
30. Knight, supra note 12. But see E. JoNEs, LAW OF THE SEA 56 (1972):
It is conceded that while there is no complete uniformity in princi-
ple or practice regarding the breadth of the territorial sea, yet it
is admitted that for many years there has been consensus as to the
breadth of this area. Traditional international law recognized the
marine league, that is, the limit of three nautical miles.
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mile limit, "while perhaps not dead, could no longer be considered
a rule of international law, at best it could be described as a de
jure practice of almost one-third of the states of the world."31- It
may therefore be argued that under international law, seizure of
a foreign vessel by a State within its claimed twelve-mile territorial
sea is not, without more, an unlawful act; nonrecognition of the
twelve-mile territorial sea by the foreign State notwithstanding.
THE INNOCENCE OF THE Mayaguez's PASSAGE
The Right of Innocent Passage
The SS Mayaguez is a container ship operated by, Sea-Land
Corporation of Edison, New Jersey. The vessel is designed to carry
274 thirty-five foot containers, 32 and at the time of seizure was
loaded to capacity with commercial cargo.3 3 Seizure of an unarmed
merchant vessel in territorial waters violates the internationally
recognized right of innocent passage, provided the passage is indeed
innocent and not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security
of the coastal State. Similar to the concept of a territorial sea,
the right of innocent passage is a product of both customary inter-
national law and recent codification. The extent of the right of
innocent passage is likewise lacking in certainty and definition.3 4
As a concept, the right of innocent passage is a general principle
"firmly established in international law" requiring "no supporting
argument or dictation of authority."35 It is one of the oldest rules
of public international law.36 This right is apparently the result
of an attempt to reconcile the freedom of ocean navigation with
31. S. SwARTzTmAUBER supra note 13, at 214-15.
32. Kopec, The Ships of the U.S. Flag Intermodal Fleet, 101 U.S. NAVAL
INST. PROC. 224 (May 1975).
33. Letter from Robert J. McCloskey, supra note 4.
34. See 4 M. WrEmEMAN, supra note 21, at 349; Knight, supra note 12,
at 183; Comment, Passage Through International Straits: Free or Innocent?
The Interests at Stake, 11 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 815, 816-18 (1974). For
analysis of the rights of innocent passage of warships, see The Corfu Chan-
nel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 1, 1-36; M. McDouGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIc ORDER
or Tim OcEANs 264-69 (1962); Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the
International Court of Justice: General Principles and Substantive Law, 27
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 28-9 (1950).
35. P. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITI E JURIsDic-
TioN 120 (1927).
36. Slonim, The Right of Innocent Passage and the 1958 Geneva Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea, 5 CoLum. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 96 (1966).
the theory of the territorial sea, balancing on one hand the freedom
of seas and on the other the rights of the coastal States over waters
near their shore.3 7
Under traditional international law, the right of innocent passage
was a qualified, not an absolute, immunity.38 The passage of a mer-
chant vessel through a coastal State's territorial sea was not out-
side the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the coastal State for all pur-
poses,39 the coastal State retained the recognized right to prescribe
reasonable regulations 40 applicable to all ships.41
In 1958, the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Con-
tiguous Zone was adopted,42 but rather than codifying existing
international law on the right of innocent passage, it departed sub-
stantially from existing international law.43  Article 14(4) of
section III states, inter alia: "Passage is innocent as long as it is
not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
states . . . ,,44 As pointed out by several commentators, the
emphasis on passage rather than on acts committed during passage
gives the coastal State subjective capacity to determine if passage
is prejudicial to its "peace, good order or security. '4 Conceivably,
it allows the coastal State to interfere with passage because of the
nature of the cargo or its ultimate destination.40 Such subjectivity
and discretion by the coastal State has led to fears "that the coastal
states might impose unreasonable burdens on international com-
37. P. JEssuP, supra note 34, at 120. Hugo Grotius, 1583-1645, an eminent
Dutch jurist and statesman whose writings were very influential in the
seventeenth century development of international law, maintained the right
of innocent passage was based on the purpose of promoting commerce.
Slonim, supra note 36, at 96. Modern commentators have said the purpose
is wider than trade; the coastal State's sovereignty did not extend to con-
trolling the use of the territorial sea so as to prevent the passage of foreign
merchant vessels which posed no threat to the safety or welfare of the
coastal State. I G. HAcKwoRTE, supra note 7, at 646.
38. 4 M. WrrmviMA, supra note 21, at 349.
39. Id.
40. Harvard Research on International Law, 23 Am. J. INT'L L. 295 (spec.
supp. 1929).
41. Reasonable regulations may include sailing regulations, traffic sepa-
ration schemes, rules of the road, obligatory pilotage and protection of
structures provisions applicable to all ships. C. COLOmBOS, supra note 11,
at 132.
42. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, supra note
20.
43. Slonim, supra note 36, at 101.
44. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, supra note
20.
45. 4 M. WBITEmAN, supra note 21, at 346; Hearn, The Law of the Sea-
The 1958 Geneva Conference, JAG J. 3, 5 (Mar.-Apr. 1960); Knight, supra
note 12, at 183-84; Slonim, supra note 36, at 101.
46. Hearn, supra note 45, at 5.
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merce by categorizing for political, military or economic reasons,
certain types of passage as not innocent. '47
The subjective discretion granted under article 14 is not total,
however. Article 16 says a coastal State may take necessary steps
to prevent passage which is not innocent, 48 but the State's deter-
mination of "innocence" may not be wholly without reference to
international law. If a coastal State's determination of what con-
stitutes innocent passage exceeds the necessities of protecting its
real interests, and interferes with the legitimate interests of a
foreign State, it establishes an abuse of rights,49 and ipso facto-
an international wrong.
Cambodian Claims of Noninnocence of Passage
Following the seizure of the Mayaguez on May 12, the govern-
ment of Cambodia offered four rationales for the interference with
the right of innocent passage. The first explanation asserted was
47. Knight, supra note 12, at 184. The almost complete subjectivity of
what constitutes innocent passage was addressed at the 1974 Caracas session
of the Third Law of the Sea Conference by proposals to amend article 16
of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. The
proposed amendment by Great Britain was substantively similar to a joint
proposal by the U.S.S.R., People's Republic of Bulgaria, German Democratic
Republic, and the Polish People's Republic and proposals by Oman and Fiji,
and provided that the following activities would constitute noninnocent pas-
sage when authorization was obtained from the coastal State or the activi-
ties were otherwise justified under international law:
(a) [A]ny exercise or practice with weapons;
(b) the launching or taking on board of aircraft
(c) the launching, landing or recovery of any military device;
(d) the embarking or disembarking of any person or cargo con-
trary to the laws or regulations of the coastal state;
(e) any act aimed at interfering with any system of communica-
tion of the coastal state;
(f) any act aimed at interfering with any other facilities or in-
stallations of the coastal state.
None of the proposed amendments were adopted. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/C.2/L.3 (1974) (Great Britain); U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.26 (1974)
(Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic, Poland, U.S.S.R.); U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/C.2/L.16 (1974) (Oman); U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.19 (1974)
(Fiji).
48. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra
note 20, art. 16.
49. BowETT, supra note 29, at 44; the coastal State is by no means com-
pletely free to inhibit passage as it sees fit. Burke, supra note 18, at 196,
200.
that the Mayaguez was only one of several spy vessels seized in
the Gulf of Thailand. These vessels were claimed to be manned
by the United States Central Intelligence Agency agents who were
to establish contact with other agents on Cambodian soil."° A
second explanation, made in the same communique, stated Cam-
bodian forces merely wanted to examine the vessel, question the
crew and warn against any further moves so close to Cambodian
territory." The third explanation was rendered by Information
Minister Hu Nim on May 18, 1975 in a four-hundred-word com-
munique which charged the Mayaguez incident to be a "blatant
provocation" by the United States to "execute a preestablished
plan" to destroy Cambodian ports and economic facilities.5 2
Perhaps a fourth and enlightening explanation was given by
Cambodian Deputy Premier Ieng Sary in an August interview. He
said the decision to capture the ship was made by the "local
commander at the scene" who found the ship in Cambodian terri-
torial waters. Defending the capture, the Deputy Premier said
Cambodian local fighters, though "not technicians," had discovered
radio equipment aboard the Mayaguez, indicating it was a spy
ship. 53 Thus, the seizure was probably a local action by Cambo-
dian military forces, and any claims that the Mayaguez's passage
was prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of Cambodia
are apparently not grounded on rational considerations of the
terms.
The local action explanation appears plausible in light of other
events occurring contemporaneously in the Gulf of Thailand-a
Cambodian attack on a Korean freighter on May 4, 1975,54 a Cam-
bodian seizure and detention of a Panamanian freighter on May
7, 1975,55 and the firing from unidentified fishing-style vessels on
the SS Gateway City twenty-five miles southeast of Sattahip,
Thailand on July 8, 1975.56 Additionally, a Cambodian spokesman
claimed his government had not learned of the local commander's
50. N.Y. Times, May 16, 1975, at 1, col. 4.
51. Id. at 15, col. 5.
52. Id., May 18, 1975, at 6, col. 1.
53. L.A. Times, Aug. 31, 1975, § I, at 24, col. 5.
54. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
55. Id.
56. Associated Press Dispatch, July 11, 1975, in 101 U.S. NAy. INST. PRoc.
122 (Oct. 1975). The Gateway City had replaced the Mayaguez on the reg-
ular cargo run from Hong Kong and is of very similar appearance. The
Gateway City is 469 feet in length with a beam width of 72 feet, and car-
ries 226, 35-foot containers while the Mayaguez is 504 feet in length with
a beam width of 74 feet, and carries 274, 35-foot containers. Both are
operated by Sea-Land Service.
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capture of the Mayaguez until hearing of the seizure on United
States radio.57 The United States Government and the owners of
the Mayaguez maintained the ship was not a spy vessel, but was on
a regular commercial run from Hong Kong to Thailand.58 An
evaluation of the Cambodian claims that the Mayaguez was a spy
ship, as well as part of a preestablished plan to destroy Cambodian
ports, viewed in conjunction with the probability the seizure was
an unauthorized local action by Cambodian military forces, indi-
cates strongly that the Mayaguez's passage was not prejudicial to
the peace, good order or security of Cambodia, and any subjective
attempt to so define it by Cambodia would constitute an abuse of
rights. If the passage of the Mayaguez was not innocent, then there
apparently is no meaning to the term "innocent passage." There-
fore, the seizure of the Mayaguez while in innocent passage was
almost certainly an international wrong against the vessel's flag
state-the United States.
CAMBODIA'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WAI ISLANDS
The actions taken by Cambodia in seizing the Mayaguez in its
territorial sea can be arguably lawful only if, as discussed pre-
viously,59 the vessel was within the territorial waters of Cambodia.
However, this argument is premised on Cambodia's lawful exer-
cise of sovereignty over the Wai Islands. Cambodia's claims to the
Wai Islands are not undisputed. To the contrary, Vietnam has
claimed the islands since the two nations were partitioned from
French Indochina in July 1954. Both nations continue to assert sov-
ereignty over the islands; although neither has a clearly superior
claim, the Vietnamese have achieved a superior position in the area,
casting doubts on whether Cambodia could at all lawfully claim
the surrounding territorial sea.
Poulo Wa Islands are a small rocky group lying fifty-four and
one-half nautical miles southwest of the Vietnamese island of Phu
Quoc.60 Even their designation is unsettled-they are referred to
57. L.A. Times, supra note 53.
58. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1975, at 19, col. 4; Letter from Robert J. McClos-
key, supra note 4.
59. See notes 8-31 supra and accompanying text.
60. Chart of Can Tho, (1: 5000,000), published by the National Geographic
Society of Vietnam (2d ed. 1969).
as Ko Way or Ko Wai, the Cambodian designations, and appear
on French and Vietnamese charts as Hon Wai or Poulo Wai.
Dissension began over these and other islands immediately after
Cambodia became independent June 21, 1954.01 The boundary be-
tween Cambodia and Vietnam was not extended out into the Gulf
of Thailand and no determination was made as to ownership of
islands off the shores of either country. Consequently, the Wai
Islands were claimed by both nations 62
On November 1, 1955, the Cambodians charged that Vietnamese
soldiers occupied the disputed islands in the Gulf of Thailand, con-
fiscated fishing vessels, and held propaganda meetings proclaiming
the sovereignty of Vietnam over them. 3 On November 29, 1955,
Cambodia alleged Vietnamese customs officials had arrested, de-
'tained and fined Cambodian fishermen in the vicinity of the dis-
puted islands, releasing them after a warning that the islands were
Vietnamese.64 Again, on December 3, 1955, Cambodia complained
that its fishermen were chased from the area by Vietnamese
customs officials. 65
Cambodia submitted a formal complaint to the International Con-
trol Commission on January 4, 1956, claiming Vietnam had com-
mitted border violations by occupying the islands. 6 The Commis-
sion directed its supervising team to investigate the boundary dis-
pute, but the team reported Cambodian authorities were unable to
produce conclusive documentary proof that the islands were inter-
nationally recognized as Cambodian territory.67 The Commission
informed the Cambodian government that the boundary was "in
dispute" and the Commission was not competent to sit in judgment
over territorial disputes.0 8
In March and April 1960, the Saigon government called on the
Cambodian government to renounce claims to the disputed islands,
a proposition rejected by Cambodia.6 9 In 1964 Prince Sihanouk
61. M. LEIFER, CAmBoDIA, A SEARCH FOR SECURITY 95-96 (1967).
62. Id.; Fifth Interim Report of the International Commission for Super-
vision and Control of Cambodia for the Period Oct. 1, 1955 to Dec. 31, 1956,
at 35 (1957).
63. Fifth Interim Report, supra note 62, at 35.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.; KV LEiFER, supra note 61.
67. M. LEmFm, supra note 61; Fifth Interim Report, supra note 62, at
35-36. The International Control Commission reported it was unable to ob-
tain any information from the French High Commission which claimed doc-
uments could not be located because the archives were dispersed, and the
main part of which had been destroyed during the Japanese occupation.
68. VL LEin', supra note 61; Fifth Interim Report, supra note 62, at 35.
69. R. SMTH, CAABODiA's FOI.GN Poiicy 159 (1965).
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of Cambodia made an assertion of sovereignty over the islands as
well as a province of the Republic of Vietnam;70 a contention
which was not followed by any attempts to exercise sovereignty.7 1
Apparently no attempt to assert Cambodian sovereignty over
Poulo Wai was made until several weeks before the seizure of the
Mayaguez, when Cambodia's Khymer Routge forces established a
garrison there.72 The Cambodian occupation was very brief;
Vietnamese troops landed on Poulo Wa the night of June 10, 1975,
overran the Cambodian garrison and took control of it.
73
The effect under international law of the disputed claims of
sovereignty is unclear, but a dispute between Great Britain and
France over small islands in the English Channel 74 provides a
parallel for comparison.
The Minquiers and Ecrehos are small islets and rocks in the
English Channel, the Minquiers lying nine and eight-tenths miles
from the English island of Jersey and eight miles from the French
Chausey Islands; Ecrehos being three and nine-tenths miles from
Jersey and six and six-tenths from the French mainland. Both
Great Britain and France had claimed them in the dispute begin-
ning in the year 1066.75 Over the course of the disagreement,
Great Britain exercised possession almost exclusively, except for
brief occupations by King Phillip Augustus of France in the thir-
teenth century. In the greater part of the nineteenth and during
the entire twentieth century, Great Britain exercised sovereignty
over the islands, enjoying possession and establishing a customs
house. The International Court of Justice awarded the disputed
islands to Great Britain, primarily on the basis that Great Britain
had acquired possession of them through continuous and effective
exercise of state functions over them.
76
70. M. LEnR, supra note 61.
71. F. MuNsox, AREA HANDBOOK FOR CAmvoDTD 7 (1968).
72. L.A. Times, May 12, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
73. N.Y. Times, June 14, 1975, at 1, cols. 1, 5 & 9.
74. The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, [1953] LC.J. 47.
75. Id.
76. See The MAinquiers and Ecrehos Case, [1953] I.C.J. 47; H. KmsEN,
PRINcIPLEs oF hERNATiONAL LAW 316 n.7 (R. Tucker ed. 1966); D. O'CoN-
N ELL, supra note 5, at 496; 1 G. SWAENmERGm, A MANumL OF INTERATIONAL
LAW 115 (4th ed. 1960).
In a separate opinion Judge Basdevant stated:
These islands are practically uninhabited and most are uninhabit-
able. From a military point of view, for the King of England to
hold them, it is not necessary that he should maintain a garrison
there; it is sufficient that by reason of his military and naval power,
he should be in a position to intervene there when he considers it
appropriate without being prevented from doing so by force8 of the
King of France and that, by the same token, he should be in a
position to prevent intervention by these forces. 77
In comparison, Poulo Wai apparently has been under the exer-
cised sovereignty of Vietnam from November 1955 until the
present, with only an interruption of several weeks during the
spring of 1975, during which time Cambodia claimed the territorial
water around the island and seized the Mayaguez. Though the time
of possession by Vietnam is much less than that of Great Britain
in the Minquiers and Ecrehos Islands, the argument may be ad-
vanced that under international law Vietnam, and not Cambodia,
has the better claim to Poulo Wai and its surrounding territorial
sea. In this view, Cambodia's seizure of the Mayaguez was an inter-
national wrong; the vessel was not in Cambodia's territorial waters
at all.
CONCLUSION
The seizure of the freighter Mayaguez demonstrated that under
current views of international law, the exercise of sovereignty by
a coastal State within a claimed twelve-mile limit is not itself an
international wrong, even if the affected foreign State only recog-
nizes a three-mile territorial sea. The coastal State's determination
of what constitutes passage prejudicial to its peace, good order or
security is subjective and discretionary: too great a departure
from protection of its own interests, with a corresponding infringe-
ment on the interests of the foreign State, will be regarded as
an international wrong. Additionally, the premise that Cambodia
actually had an internationally recognized claim to Poulo Wai
is opened to doubts by an examination of the facts of territorial
possession in the Gulf of Thailand.
Therefore, the initiation of reprisal by the United States was a
lawful response to the international wrong of seizing a merchant
vessel on the high seas.
ROBERT E. WARD
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